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The media have had nothing but good news to report lately, with tales of drug busts, fallen strongholds, and a supposedly successful campaign known as Operation Mostarak.
Operation Moshtarak was the February 2009 coalition offensive against the insurgency in Afghanistan's southern Helmand province. It was unique not only for being the biggest operation of its kind to date, but also for the unprecedented amountof publicity surrounding it.
Why so much publicity? Two reasons. First, Marjahwas touted as the last major Taliban stronghold in southern Helmand. President Barack Obama's 30,000-troop 'surge' seems more acceptable if there is "just one more thing left to do". Second, much was made about the name "Moshtarak". Almost every report in the Western media about the operation explains that Moshtarak (مشترك) means 'together' inDari, one of the two major languages of Afghanistan. The implication being that the West is working together with the Afghan population against the Taliban, to build a democracy, and so on.
The Western public is still, after eight years, unaware of exactly who the Taliban are and what they want. Even people who have had close contact with the Taliban comment about how hard it is to understand them. Given this lack of understanding, it is unsurprising that most of the Western public are also unaware of lesser details -- like in most of southern Afghanistan, and particularly Helmand province, very few people actually speak Dari. Most in that region speak Afghanistan's other official language, Pashto. So, are we demonstrating 'togetherness' with the local population in Marjah? Hardly.
In fact, journalists themselves sometimes recognize that it is hard to be sure of the extent to which the Afghan population is being brought together by the operation since journalists are typically only embedded with the coalition forces and not the insurgents, thus they only receive one side of the story.
Why was the operation given a Dari name? Because most of the Afghan National Army battalions taking part in the operation came from the northern and eastern parts of the country where they do speak Dari. The argument could be made that we are demonstrating 'togetherness' with the Afghan troops. That's a slightly better point, but using Afghan National Security Forces from other regions hardly demonstrates togetherness with the local population because, historically, the country is so culturally fragmented.
The prominent role of the Afghan security forces in Operation Moshtarak is supposedly another reason for the operation's uniqueness. Afghan security forces comprised about 60 percent of the operation's 15,000 troops. In fact, coalition troops have been working with the Afghans for quite a while now, in operations such as Operation Panchai Palang (Panther's Claw) -- a similar offensive to wrest territory from insurgents in the summer of 2009. Incidentally, using panchai palang to mean 'panther's claw' also only works in Dari.
How have the Afghan security forces fared with their expanded role? We know very little because of the way the media has reported it. Naturally, we're more concerned about our own (British and American) boys and girls out there, but we should also be hearing about the Afghan troops with whom we're in this "together" with. The UK's Telegraph paper provided one of the better reports, quoting an Afghan General. But the subhead of the article still reads, "...after thousands of British and American troops attacked in the early hours." Where were the Afghan troops at this time?
Did Operation Moshtarak take down the last Taliban stronghold? Actually, the significance of Marjah was overstated. But in any case, the Afghan flag was raised as a symbol of the op's success, so technically it was a victory. Was the Taliban destroyed, though? No (not least because the Taliban senior leadership, The Quetta Shura, is based Pakistan). Many insurgents probably fled the area before the troops arrived -- which is one of the stated reasons to advertise the operation beforehand, i.e. to reduce the fighting.
What is also probable, though, is that those who fled are the commanders who actually represent the insurgency. Many of those who stayed and fought were probably from Marjah and had nowhere else to go, or else they were teenage "$10-fighters" who were not fighting for ideology, politics, or religion, but rather for ... $10. These are hardly the extremist Taliban that we wished to eliminate.
The flag-raising imagery represents something meaningful only if you come from the Eddie Izzard school of flag imperialism. But most of the Western public is not familiar enough with the nuances of the situation on the ground in Afghanistan for them to realize this.
The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General McChrystal, has re-defined the situation in Afghanistan as a 'war of perceptions', but it is unclear exactly whose perceptions are the most important. The Western public's perception is important, of course, because its support is needed to justify NATO's continued investment in Afghanistan. But the Afghan public is also important, because, we're led to believe, all of this is for them.
So, what do the Afghans think? Actually, they're wondering what all the fuss was about in the first place.
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